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#1 2026-08-01 16:09:29

M-Reimer
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Registered: 2020-06-03
Posts: 27

How safe is Arch against malware being added to official packages?

Since the AUR attacks keep coming I'm asking myself how long it will take for the first "official" package being shipped with malware or better: How well protected Arch actually is against this scenario?

AUR more or less always told users to read the source code of PKGBUILDs before executing them. Everyone can upload on AUR and so packages should not be trusted.

The situation is clearly different for packages coming from the official repos. It requires some "onboarding process" for new people to be allowed publishing there.

But isn't this still a risk? While on AUR you only get sourcecode and so it at least is possible to review that before executing, as far as I know Arch packages are still compiled on the individual PCs of Arch team members. So it is not impossible that a PKGBUILD without any suspicous stuff is pushed to GIT while the compiled binary still has something malicious in it?

Unfortunately there still seems to be no build machine which auto-builds PKGBUILDS, created by maintainers. This would prevent against something like this from ever happening.

Another way to verify that a package actually was built exactly how it is described in the PKGBUILD would be reproducible builds. But so far there still are many packages that can not be built that way.

So long story short: What are the lines of defence in place against malware packages in official repositories? Is it really just "trust" or is there something more substantial in place?

Last edited by M-Reimer (2026-08-01 16:11:45)

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#2 2026-08-01 17:32:04

5hridhyan
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Registered: 2025-12-25
Posts: 1,024
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Re: How safe is Arch against malware being added to official packages?

Is it really just "trust" or is there something more substantial in place?

Humans? No "Human being" can be trusted 100% btw.
Yes. Official repos can be infected. Possible scenarios would be a dev gone rogue, their keys got compromised, build infra got compromised and this list continues, but its far "safer" than the AUR mainly because of the trust model. Not everyone  can sign up and push packages to the official repos. One should earn the trust within the existing maintainers and wider community and follow strict packaging guidelines. Have their own keys, and if it got reported of being  compromised, then their keys would be revoked and as soon as pacman gets to know about it, it will reject packages to be installed by that signature.
At some point, trust must be anchored somewhere --whether in the developer writing the code, the maintainer packaging it, or the infrastructure hosting it. The official repositories [core] and [extra] aren't "unhackable"; they are simply hardened through multi-layered friction...

Last edited by 5hridhyan (2026-08-01 17:38:27)

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#3 2026-08-01 20:02:54

seth
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Registered: 2012-09-03
Posts: 77,538

Re: How safe is Arch against malware being added to official packages?

If we ignore that 'he first "official" package being shipped with malware' could have been xz if it wasn't <project you don't like and could call a malaise>, ie that the upstream risk is abysmally higher:

Is it really just "trust" or is there something more substantial in place?

there still seems to be no build machine which auto-builds PKGBUILDS, created by maintainers

You're sitting in front of it, https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Arch_build_system - otherwise you'd have to *trust* whoever controls the build server - and the servers integrity (which immediately becomes a high-profile target)
That burden can only be diffused by

reproducible builds. But so far there still are many packages that can not be built that way.

https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Reprod … elping_out
ie. reproducible builds make it more likely that efforts to spike the binary get eventually caught.

The AUR gets attacked vandalized because it's by it's nature the softest of all soft targets, open to every script-kiddie ever.
But in reality you're already applying an awful lot of trust to many people who give you things for free…

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